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Abstract
Cognitive and social psychologists have long investigated dual-process theories of
automaticity and control. These theories seek to explain and predict the conditions
under which people can intentionally control their judgments and behavior in the face
of impulses produced by biasing and distracting incidental stimuli. Based on this dual-
process perspective, cognitive and social psychologists have developed tasks that cre-
ate conditions under which impulses act in parallel or in opposition to control-oriented
processes—commonly referred to as response conflict tasks. Though the response con-
flict tasks used by cognitive and social psychologists are often structurally similar,
researchers from the two disciplines often interpret performance on such tasks in very
different ways: Cognitive psychologists tend to focus on the contributions of control-
oriented processes, whereas social psychologists generally focus on the contributions of
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activated mental associations. Both of these interpretations rest on assumptions of pro-
cess purity: that a response conflict task reflects either control-oriented processes or
mental associations. However, this assumption is untenable. Both types of mental pro-
cesses jointly influence behavioral responses on most response conflict tasks. Multino-
mial processing tree models are well suited to assess the contributions of multiple
cognitive processes to response conflict tasks commonly used in cognitive and social
psychology. In this chapter, we review the applications of multinomial processing trees
to response conflict tasks, and highlight their utility in bridging interpretive divides that
separate cognitive and social psychologists.
When are judgments and behaviors driven by impulses, and under what
conditions can these impulses be controlled? In the decades since
Schneider and Shiffrin first proposed the two-process theory of human
information processing (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977), the distinction
between automatically-activated impulses and control-oriented processes
that override impulses has been central to the fields of cognitive and social
psychology. To investigate questions of automaticity and control,
researchers have developed methods and measures that create conditions
under which automatically-activated impulses act in concert with or in
opposition to control-oriented processes. Such measures are broadly
referred to as response conflict (or response interference) tasks and are
widely-used in both cognitive and social psychology.
Though cognitive and social psychologists often use response conflict tasks
that are structurally similar, they interpret performance on these tasks in very
different ways. For example, consider the Go/No-Go Task (Donders, 1969)
and theGo/No-GoAssociationTask (Nosek&Banaji, 2001). In both tasks,
participants view a continuous sequence of target stimuli and must produce
behavioral (i.e., “Go”) responses to some targets and withhold behavioral
responses (i.e., “No-Go”) to others. The frequency with which participants
fail to withhold responses on no-go trials is generally interpreted by cogni-
tive psychologists as an index of (lack of ) inhibitory control, but is inter-
preted by social psychologists as an index of the strength of behavioral
impulses activated by the stimuli. Hence, two tasks that are procedurally
identical are interpreted to reflect fundamentally different mental processes.
As another example of structurally-similar tasks interpreted differently
across disciplines, consider the Stroop (1935) task and the Implicit Associ-
ation Test (IAT: Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), two of the most
commonly used measures in cognitive and social psychology, respectively.
On the Stroop task, the names of colors are presented in a variety of colors
(e.g., RED printed in green), and participants respond to the color in which
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the word is printed rather than the semantic meaning of the word. On the
IAT, stimuli are presented representing two concepts (e.g., the ingroup and
the outgroup) and two attributes (e.g., good and bad), and participants cat-
egorize them into one of the four categories. Both the Stroop and IAT tasks
consist of so-called compatible trials and incompatible trials. On compatible
trials of the Stroop (e.g., RED printed in red), both the well-learned impulse
to read the word and the task-appropriate response to name the color in
which the word is presented produce the same response. However, on
incompatible trials (e.g., RED printed in blue), word-reading conflicts with
color-naming. Similarly, on compatible trials of the IAT (e.g., good words
and pictures of the ingroup share a response key), response impulses based on
both well-learned associations (e.g., regarding one’s ingroup) and the task-
appropriate response produce the same outcome. However, on incompat-
ible trials (e.g., bad words and pictures of the ingroup share a response key)
the response impulse produced by activated associations conflicts with the
contextually task-appropriate response. On both the Stroop and the IAT,
response latencies are typically faster and accuracy is higher on compatible
than incompatible trials. Yet, despite structural similarities between the
two tasks, differences in responding to compatible and incompatible trials
on the Stroop are generally interpreted as a measure of inhibitory control,
whereas differences in responding to compatible and incompatible trials
on the IAT are generally interpreted as a measure of the strength of mental
associations activated by the stimuli.
One possibility for these interpretive differences is that one (or both)
research tradition has mischaracterized the psychological processes that
determine performance on response conflict tasks. We argue for a different
possibility: Rather than reflecting pure measures of any cognitive process,
response conflict tasks reflect the joint contributions of impulse activation
and control-oriented processes. Guided by this perspective, we propose that
multinomial processing trees can be powerful tools to identify and disentan-
gle the joint contributions of multiple cognitive processes to response con-
flict tasks. aIn this chapter, we review multinomial processing trees within
cognitive and social psychology, highlighting their applications and major
theoretical and methodological contributions. Additionally, we emphasize
a A third possibility for the disparate ways in which cognitive and social psychologists interpret perfor-
mance on response conflict tasks is that different stimuli (e.g., color-related words versus pictures of
outgroup members) activate qualitatively distinct mental processes. However, we argue that the
dual-process perspective is more parsimonious: Rather than activating qualitatively distinct processes,
different stimuli activate the same cognitive processes to differing degrees.
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their utility in bridging interpretive divides that separate cognitive and social
psychologists, and offer suggestions for how multinomial processing trees
can further aid in theory development.
1. The problem with process-purity
Consider a case of a literate adult and a pre-literate child performing a
Stroop task. The adult and the child may perform equally well at naming the
color in which a word is presented on incongruent trials (e.g., RED printed
in green), but for very different reasons. The adult has a strong impulse to
respond to the semantic meaning of the word formed through a lifetime of
reading experience, but she also has a fully-developed frontal cortex and is,
thus, able to inhibit her well-practiced impulse of reading in order to suc-
cessfully name the color. Conversely, due to her young age, the child can
identify colors but has not yet learned to read, so there is no impulse to read
the word for her (still-developing) frontal cortex to inhibit in order for her to
successfully name the color. Taken together, two different combinations of
processes—the adult’s strong word-reading impulse and strong inhibition
ability, and the child’s weak word-reading impulse and weak inhibition
ability—produce the same observable outcome. Differences in Stroop per-
formance are typically interpreted as reflecting differences in inhibition, but
this example and others (e.g., native versus non-native speakers) illustrate the
limitations of such process-pure perspectives. Aggregated task performance
in itself cannot distinguish between differences resulting from variation in
behavioral impulses and differences resulting from variation in inhibition.
As such, assumptions of task purity can obscure meaningful differences at
the process level.
We certainly are not the first to address the issue of process purity in
experimental tasks. Jacoby (1991) brought this insight to bear nearly 30 years
ago to the study of recognitionmemory. Previously, different types of mem-
ory were frequently measured using distinct tasks. For example, recollection
was measured using direct recall tasks, whereas familiarity was measured
using word fragment completion tasks. Jacoby argued that this approach
was inherently flawed because it equated a particular cognitive process with
a particular task when, in reality, performance on most tasks is likely driven
by multiple processes. To address this issue, he developed a procedure to
estimate the contributions of multiple memory processes to responses on
a single task. The first part of the procedure was a task in which recollection
and familiarity produced concordant responses in one condition, but pro-
duced conflicting responses in another condition (i.e., a response conflict
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task). The second part of the procedure was a mathematical model that
formally specified the interplay of recollection and familiarity to produce
responses in each condition. Ultimately, Jacoby’s process dissociation pro-
cedure demonstrated that both recollection and familiarity influence recog-
nition judgments.
Jacoby (1991) conceptualized recollection as a relatively intentional pro-
cess, and familiarity as a relatively unintentional process which, in turn, maps
onto the dual-process framework of automatic and controlled mental
processes that is common across many fields of psychology. In the following
decades, many other researchers also interested in questions of automaticity
and control have recognized the utility and generalizability of this procedure
and have spread Jacoby’s methodological and theoretical innovations far
beyond the study of memory. The majority of the rest of this chapter focuses
upon many of the ways in which the process dissociation procedure and
related techniques have advanced, and can further advance, cognitive and
social psychology. First, however, we must introduce the class of analytic
methods to which the process dissociation procedure belongs: multinomial
processing trees.
2. Multinomial processing trees
Multinomial processing trees (MPT: Batchelder & Riefer, 1999;
Riefer & Batchelder, 1988) are a class of formal mathematical models. At
the most basic level, a formal model is simply a theory that is specified math-
ematically. By articulating a theory mathematically rather than verbally, the
purpose of a formal model is to not only identify but also quantify the pro-
cesses that account for outcomes on measures of behavior (e.g., judgments,
error rates, reaction times). Consequently, formal models precisely describe
(i.e., in mathematical equations) how multiple processes interact to produce
specific performance outcomes.
AnMPT begins with a set of parameters and a set of equations that estab-
lish relationships among the parameters. The parameters in the equations
represent the hypothesized component processes that result in distinct
categorical responses on the measure of interest (e.g., correct/incorrect,
old/new, low/mid/high confidence) and the equations define the manner
in which the processes interact to produce those responses.b MPTs can
b Accuracy is often very high, and sometimes near ceiling, on many response conflict tasks routinely used
by cognitive and social psychologists. Consequently, reasonable questions arise regarding the validity of
insight offered by a relatively infrequent response (i.e., an error). We return to this point later in the
chapter, and discuss various ways in which it has been addressed.
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accommodate data from individual participants as well as aggregate data and,
thus, can generate parameter estimates at the individual and group levels.
Entering participants’ or groups’ actual responses as outcomes in the equa-
tions yields estimates of the extents of the processes hypothesized to produce
those outcomes. SomeMPTs can be solved algebraically (e.g., Jacoby, 1991).
However, other MPTs (e.g., Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, &
Groom, 2005) require other estimation techniques (e.g., maximum likeli-
hood; MCMC sampling) to generate parameter values that create as close
a match as possible between the observed response frequencies and those
predicted by the model. The degree to which the outcomes predicted by
the model correspond to observed responses can be quantified and assessed
through goodness-of-fit statistics.
Providing sufficient fit to data is only one step in demonstrating the valid-
ity of an MPT. The construct validity of each parameter in the model—that
is, the relationship between a parameter and the psychological process it is
assumed to reflect—must be established through a series of selective-
influence studies. Such demonstrations rely on experimental manipulations
that are known, based on prior research and theorizing, to influence only
one cognitive process. Convergent validity is demonstrated if an experimen-
tal manipulation influences the intended parameter, and discriminant valid-
ity is demonstrated if the manipulation does not influence other, unrelated
parameters. Moreover, the external validity of the model is demonstrated if
parameters predict theoretically-relevant external outcomes, such as judg-
ments and behaviors. Taken together, anMPT can be considered to be valid
if it provides sufficient fit to data, its parameters are sensitive to selective
influence, and it predicts relevant outcomes.
Returning to Jacoby (1991) as an example, the process dissociation
model is instantiated as an MPT in which recollection (R) and familiarity
(F) both influence recognition memory (see Fig. 1). In the original imple-
mentation of the process dissociation procedure, participants first studied
one list of words and then studied a second list of words. In a subsequent
recognition test, they were asked to identify words under two different con-
ditions: inclusion and exclusion. In the inclusion condition, participants were
asked to respond “old” to words that had appeared on either of the lists they
had studied and to respond “new” to words that had not appeared on either
list. During this inclusion test phase, both recollection and familiarity pro-
duce the same response: Participants can correctly identify studied words
either through recollection (with probability R) or, if recollection fails,
through familiarity (F*(1R)). Thus, the equation for correctly identifying
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words in the inclusion condition is R+F(1R). In the exclusion condi-
tion, participants were asked to respond “old” to words from the second list
and to respond “new” to words that had either appeared on the first list or
were on neither of the studied lists. During this exclusion test phase, recol-
lection and familiarity produce divergent responses: Recollection will pro-
duce a correct response but, if recollection fails (1R), familiarity (F) will
produce an incorrect response. Thus, the equation for correctly identifying
words in the exclusion condition is F*(1R). Algebraically solving these
equations will yield estimates of the extent to which both recollection
and familiarity processes influence responses on this task.
2.1 The process dissociation model and its relatives
Jacoby’s process dissociation model is one of the most widely-applied
MPTs within both cognitive and social psychology. The initial version
of the model that Jacoby (1991) proposed is a control-dominant, or “early
selection,” model, in which the relatively more unintentional process influ-
ences responses only when the relatively more intentional process fails.
For example, on a recognition memory task, recollection is a relatively
more intentional process than familiarity. This control-dominant version
of the model specifies that when the two processes would produce differ-
ent responses (e.g., recollecting that a word was not presented before,
even though it seems familiar), recollection will drive the response if
both processes are activated, and familiarity can only drive a response
when recollection fails. Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) proposed an alternate
Fig. 1 A portion of Jacoby’s (1991) familiarity/recollection model. Oval represents a test
stimulus and rectangles represent latent cognitive processes hypothesized to influence
responses to the stimulus. Parameters with lines leading to them are conditional upon
preceding parameters. The table on the right side of the figure depicts correct (✓) and
incorrect (✕) responses as a function of process pattern and trial type.
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automatic-dominant, or “late correction,” version of the PD model. In
this version of the model, the relatively more intentional process only
influences responses when the relatively more unintentional process fails.
For example, on a Stroop task, color naming is a relatively more inten-
tional process than word reading. This version of the model specifies that
when the two processes would produce different responses (e.g., RED
printed in green), word reading will drive the response if both processes
are activated, and color naming can only drive a response when word
reading fails (see also Jacoby, 1998 for a synthesis of these approaches).
Within cognitive psychology, a number of variations of Jacoby’s (1991)
process dissociation model have been proposed. For example, Buchner,
Erdfelder, and Vaterrodt-Plunnecke (1995) added a parameter representing
guessing or response biases that determines behavior when neither the inten-
tional or unintentional memory process drives responses. By separately
accounting for response biases, this extended model provides relatively more
pure estimates of both types of memory. H€utter, Sweldens, Stahl,
Unkelbach, andKlauer (2012) andH€utter and Sweldens (2013) used a similar
approach to examine the extent to which evaluative conditioning depends
on contingency awareness. They operationalized memory for stimulus pair-
ings as the relatively more intentional process, the conditioned attitude
resulting from stimulus pairings as the relatively less intentional process,
and accounted for response biases in the absence of either of these influences.
In doing so, they demonstrated that evaluative conditioning can create atti-
tudes even when participants are not aware of stimulus contingencies.
Though Jacoby and colleagues’ process dissociation models were devel-
oped within the domain of cognitive psychology, and have primarily been
applied to the study of memory, the process dissociation procedure has also
been successfully applied to a variety of topics within social psychology. For
example, social psychologists often distinguish between attitudes that are
measured explicitly versus implicitly: Explicit attitudes are assessed directly,
through self-report measures, whereas implicit attitudes are inferred indi-
rectly, often from the speed or accuracy of responses rather than the contents
of responses, per se. Moreover, implicit measures often obscure what is being
measured to a greater degree than do explicit measures, and responses on
implicit measures are more difficult to strategically feign than are responses
on explicit measures. Consequently, implicit attitude measures were initially
assumed to assess qualitatively distinct processes thanwere assessed by explicit
attitude measures (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995;Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler,
2000). Implicit measures were thought to assess automatic or unconscious
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attitudes, whereas explicit measures were thought to assess conscious or
deliberately controlled attitudes. In retrospect, this assumption clearly mir-
rors the conflation of task with process in recognition memory that Jacoby
(1991) addressed. Subsequent social psychological research using the pro-
cess dissociation procedure had similar results, demonstrating that responses
on implicit measures are influenced by both relatively automatic (e.g.,
stimulus-driven behavioral impulses) and controlled (e.g., intentional
responding) processes.
Within social psychology, Jacoby’s (1991) control-dominant model has
been applied to a wide variety of implicit measures of stereotyping and
prejudice in order to reveal the joint contributions of multiple processes,
including the weapons identification task (Conrey et al., 2005; Payne,
2001), the shooter task (Plant & Peruche, 2005), and the IAT (Payne &
Bishara, 2009). Additionally, the process dissociation procedure has been
used by social psychologists to identify and measure different processes in a
variety of domains, such as moral reasoning (Conway & Gawronski, 2013;
Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf, & H€utter, 2017), processing
fluency (Fazio, Brashier, Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Unkelbach & Stahl,
2009) and judgment and decision making (Damian & Sherman, 2013;
Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006). For example,
Ferreira et al. (2006) tested the assumption that logical reasoning and
heuristic decision making are opposite poles on a processing continuum,
such that increasing the use of one form of processing necessarily decreases
the use of the other (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). To do so, they created
a series of decisions in which logical and heuristic processing would pro-
duce the same judgment in some cases, but produce conflicting judgments
in other cases. They also varied the instructions given to participants in
ways that should be expected to increase reliance on either logical (e.g.,
behave like a scientist) or heuristic (e.g., use your intuition) reasoning.
By applying the process dissociation model to participants’ responses across
a series of conditions, Ferreira et al. (2006) demonstrated that logical and
heuristic reasoning make independent and dissociable contributions to
judgments. As such, the process dissociation procedure provided a more
nuanced understanding of the relationship between two processes already
assumed to drive responses in a given domain, and provided a means to
measure those processes separately (but see Klauer, Dittrich, Scholtes, &
Voss, 2015).
Additional processes have been incorporated into conceptual extensions
of Jacoby’s (1991) model, which, in turn, have expanded process-level
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understanding of a variety of behaviors. For example, Sherman and col-
leagues’ quadruple process model (Quad model: Conrey et al., 2005;
Sherman et al., 2008) builds upon the basic assumption that a relatively uni-
ntentional process (i.e., activated mental associations) and a relatively inten-
tional process (i.e., detection of appropriate responses) jointly drive
responses on implicit measures. Additionally, the Quad model accounts
for guessing or response bias (e.g., Buchner et al., 1995), and includes a pro-
cess that intervenes to overcome the behavioral responses activated by men-
tal associations when they conflict with the detected correct response.
The structure of the Quad model is depicted as a processing tree in Fig. 2.
Using as an example an IAT that presents stimuli representing the ingroup and
outgroup along with positive and negative words, a stimulus representing the
outgroupmight activate negative mental associations (AC), which produce an
incorrect response tendency in the incompatible condition (i.e., when
“outgroup” and “good” share a response key). In contrast, accuracy-oriented
detection (D) always produces a correct response tendency (i.e., to press the
task-appropriate button). To the extent that biasing associations are overcome
(OB), detection will drive a correct response. Thus, the likelihood of one
path toward a correct response on this trial type (an outgroup stimulus in
the incompatible condition) can be represented by an equation reflecting
the activation of these three processes: ACDOB.However, to the extent
that the overcoming bias process fails (1OB), activated negative associations
Fig. 2 A portion of Conrey et al.’s (2005) quadruple process (Quad) model. Oval repre-
sents a test stimulus and rectangles represent latent cognitive processes hypothesized
to influence responses to the stimulus. Parameters with lines leading to them are con-
ditional upon all preceding parameters. The table on the right side of the figure depicts
correct (✓) and incorrect (✕) responses as a function of process pattern and trial type.
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will drive an incorrect response on this trial type, which can be represented
by the equation: ACD (1OB). Importantly, these are not the only
possible combinations of processes through which responses can be made
on a task like the IAT; instead, the Quad model posits that multiple combi-
nations of processes can drive responses. For example, a correct response to
an outgroup stimulus on an incompatible trial can also result from no associ-
ations activated and detection succeeding, (1AC)D, or from no
associations activated, detection failing, and a positivity bias driving the
response, (1AC) (1D)G. Similarly, an incorrect response to this
trial type can also result from activated associations and detection failing,
AC (1D), or from no associations activated, detection failing, and a neg-
ativity bias driving the response, (1AC) (1D) (1G). Taken
together, the likelihood of making a correct response to an outgroup stim-
ulus on an incompatible trial can be represented by the sum of these three
pathways: [ACDOB]+[(1AC)D]+[(1 AC) (1D)G];
and the likelihood of making an incorrect response can be represented
by the sum of these three pathways: [ACD (1OB)]+ [AC
(1D)]+ [(1AC) (1D) (1G)].
The Quad model has been successfully applied to a variety of implicit
measures, including the IAT, priming tasks (Conrey et al., 2005), and the
Go/No-Go association task (Gonsalkorale, von Hippel, Sherman, & Klauer,
2009; Ramos et al., 2015). One way in which the Quad model has been
instrumental is by expanding understanding of implicit attitude variability
and malleability. A process-pure interpretation of implicit measures can
only attribute variations in implicit attitudes to variations in mental associ-
ations. In contrast to this perspective, research using the Quad model has
demonstrated a number of cases in which other non-associative processes
contribute to implicit attitude variability. For example, older people dem-
onstrate greater implicit racial bias than younger people, but biased mental
associations do not vary with age. Instead, the ability to inhibit the influence
of associations decreases with age, and can account for age differences in
IAT performance (Gonsalkorale, Sherman, & Klauer, 2009, 2014). Thus,
research using theQuadmodel has provided amore nuanced understanding
of the combinations of processes that contribute to variations in implicit task
performance.
This section of the chapter is not meant to provide a complete list of
MPTs that have been applied to response conflict tasks, or even a compre-
hensive discussion of the MPTs described here. MPTs have been used to
investigate a wide variety of topics within cognitive and social psychology,
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such as sourcemonitoring (Batchelder &Riefer, 1990; Batchelder, Riefer, &
Hu, 1994; Bayen, Murnane, & Erdfelder, 1996; Klauer & Ehrenberg, 2005;
Klauer & Meiser, 2000), social categorization (Klauer & Wegener, 1998),
illusory truth (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992), hindsight bias (Erdfelder &
Buchner, 1998), gender bias (Buchner & Wippich, 1996), age-related false
memory ( Jacoby, Bishara, Hessels, & Toth, 2005), stereotype formation
(Meiser & Hewstone, 2004), and propositional reasoning (Klauer &
Oberauer, 1995; Oberauer, 2006), among many others. Additionally, a
number of MPTs have also been applied to various implicit measures, such
as the extrinsic affective Simon task (Stahl & Degner, 2007), affect mis-
attribution procedure (Payne, Hall, Cameron, & Bishara, 2010), stereo-
type misperception task (Krieglmeyer & Sherman, 2012), and the IAT
(Meissner & Rothermund, 2013).c In the following sections, we highlight
how MPTs have been used—and can be further used—to build bridges
between cognitive and social psychology.
3. Multinomial processing trees and the future
of cognitive and social psychology
MPTs have made many important contributions to cognitive and
social psychology. In contrast to verbal models that can be subjectively inter-
preted to the point of unfalsifiability, MPTs represent precise specifications
of theory that can be evaluated quantitatively. Moreover, because they
resolve the confound inherent in equating tasks with processes, MPTs have
advanced process-level understanding of many tasks that are used widely
both within and beyond the domains of cognitive and social psychology.
Despite these advances, process-pure interpretations of response con-
flict tasks remain dominant across both cognitive and social psychology
(e.g., Bluemke et al., 2017; Snyder, Miyake, & Hankin, 2015). The persis-
tence of the process-pure perspective will ultimately limit scientific pro-
gress because it not only obscures the influence of many important
processes but also, in many cases, simply misrepresents reality. One of
our goals in writing this chapter is to highlight some of the many issues that
have been resolved using MPTs in order to inspire researchers to apply
MPTs to new questions. We outline some of these issues below, but there
are certainly more.
c The extent to which any of the experimental paradigms cited here fit cleanly within our definition of
response conflict tasks can be debated. However, rather than focusing on methodological nuance, we
err on the side of providing the interested reader more rather than less information.
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3.1 Building bridges
MPTs can be helpful in building bridges between cognitive and social psy-
chology. Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation procedure is an excellent
example of a flexible model that has been profitably applied across content
domains. As we have discussed above, the process dissociation procedure
and its variants have been used to investigate diverse research topics such
as memory, executive functioning, evaluative conditioning, judgment
and decision-making, moral reasoning, and implicit attitudes. Though
the meaning of the intentional and unintentional processes may vary across
topics, Jacoby’s (1991) model provides a common framework that spans
content (Payne, 2005). For example, Sherman, Groom, Ehrenberg, and
Klauer (2003) investigated a question at the intersection of cognitive and
social psychology by applying a modified version of Jacoby’s (1991) model
to a task designed to assess false memory for stereotype-related information.
In doing so, they demonstrated that the availability of cognitive resources
had no influence on the extents of familiarity or recollection for stereotype-
inconsistent information. In contrast, when cognitive resources were
impaired, memory for stereotype-consistent information was influenced
to a greater extent by familiarity and to a lesser extent by recollection.
3.2 Advances to date
In addition to building bridges between disciplines, MPTs also have been
used to establish relationships among different types of cognitive processes.
For example, in the anti-saccade task (Hallett, 1978), participants must over-
come the reflexive impulse to look at a visual target appearing in their
peripheral vision and, instead, attend to a target that has appeared in the
opposite direction. This task is widely used among cognitive psychologists
to measure inhibition. In contrast, social psychologists have routinely
employed sequential priming-type tasks in order measure associations
while minimizing the influence of control-oriented processes, such as
inhibition. However, Payne (2005) found that process-dissociation esti-
mates of intentional responding from two sequential priming variants—
the weapons identification task (Payne, 2001) and an evaluative priming
task (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995)—were related to perfor-
mance on the anti-saccade task, which suggests that a common process
(e.g., inhibition) underlies responses on all three of these tasks. Similarly,
Buchner, Erdfelder, Steffens, and Martensen (1997) applied an MPT to a
recognition memory task and a source monitoring task and demonstrated
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that both tasks share an underlying process. Neither of these examples is
intended to suggest that any one of these tasks is a pure measure of any
given process, but rather to draw connections between tasks by highlight-
ing common underlying processes.
Other research has used MPTs to sharpen the conclusions drawn from
neuropsychological work. Specifically, the ability of MPTs to isolate cogni-
tive processes allows for those processes to be localized in brain regions with
greater precision than aggregate task performance can provide. For example,
Beer et al. (2008) found that Quad model estimates of stimulus detection
from an IAT are related to brain areas associated with conflict monitoring,
and estimates of White-pleasant and Black-unpleasant associations are
related to activity in brain areas associated with processing of positive and
negative information. Importantly, these brain areas also correlated with
aggregate task performance on the IAT, but Quad modeling provided more
nuanced understanding by connecting specific processes with specific brain
regions. Similarly, Amodio, Devine, andHarmon-Jones (2008) and Amodio
et al. (2004) found that process-dissociation estimates of intentional
responding from a weapons identification task are related to activity in brain
areas associated with conflict monitoring.
MPTs are also well-suited to advance both theory and methodology
by resolving discrepancies among measures. Different measures that
assess the same construct or attitude object sometimes correlate strongly
(e.g., Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001), but sometimes do not
(e.g., Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2014; Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000;
Nosek & Banaji, 2001). Nosek and Banaji (2001) argued that the lack
of correspondence between the IAT and Go/No-Go Association Task
(and among implicit measures more generally) may be due to low reliabil-
ity. To be sure, implicit measures are generally less reliable than explicit
measures (e.g., Gawronski, Morrison, Phills, & Galdi, 2017), but this may
be only part of the issue. Different measures also have different response
demands. For instance, the Go/No-Go Association Task requires that
some responses be withheld, but the IAT has no such requirement. Pro-
cedural demands necessarily determine which processes influence task
performance (Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). MPTs can help to isolate
processes of interest from other (e.g., method-specific) processes and, in
doing so, may increase correspondence across measures. Indeed, Payne
(2005) demonstrated that aggregate task performance (i.e., response accu-
racy) on a weapons identification task was unrelated to response accuracy
on an evaluative priming task, even though both tasks are assumed to
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reflect the same construct (i.e., race-related mental associations). How-
ever, process-dissociation estimates of controlled responding generated from
the weapons identification task were related to estimates of controlled
responding generated from the priming task. Similarly, process-dissociation
estimates of mental associations generated from the weapons identification
task were related to estimates of associations generated from the priming task.
Thus, MPTs helped to establish relationships between conceptually-similar
measures that were otherwise obscured by aggregate task performance. Such
an approach could be useful for establishing both similarities and differences
among tasks, which, in turn, could ultimately help to develop a taxonomy of
implicit measures similar to the executive function framework that exists
within cognitive psychology (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). Using the processes
described by theQuadmodel (Conrey et al., 2005) as an example ofwhat such
a taxonomy could look like, one category might consist of implicit measures
that rely more heavily on the detection of appropriate responses, whereas
another category might consist of implicit measures that rely more heavily
on the inhibition of mental associations that conflict with appropriate
responses. This will be a fruitful direction for future research.
In addition to helping to resolve discrepancies among measures, the
framework formalized in the MPT approach has initiated the development
of new methodologies. For example, when Jacoby (1991) initially proposed
the process dissociation procedure, he elaborated on an existing recognition
memory task in order to create conditions under which recollection and
familiarity sometimes produce the same response but sometimes produce
conflicting responses. In contrast, Krieglmeyer and Sherman (2012) designed
the Stereotype Misperception Task and its accompanying MPT to specifi-
cally test their theoretical assumptions about the interplay between stereo-
type activation and application. Of course, theory and method are often
developed synergistically: Theories can enable the development of new
methods, and methods can generate previously-inconceivable data, which,
in turn, inspire new theories (Greenwald, 2012). Because MPTs require the
precise mathematical specification of the theorized relationships among pro-
cesses, they can be thought of as the methodological embodiment of theory.
Thus, they are especially well-suited to advance both method and theory.
3.3 Advances to come
MPTs have been used extensively within cognitive psychology to study
memory but, perhaps surprisingly, they are not used as often to study other
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mental phenomena. MPTs are readily applied to response conflict tasks, and
cognitive psychologists have for decades been using a wide variety of
response conflict tasks to measure executive functions such as inhibiting,
shifting, and updating (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000). However, to date, MPTs
have been used only sparsely to investigate executive functions. For exam-
ple, the Stroop (1935) task is generally interpreted as a measure of inhibition,
and Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) applied a version of the procession dissoci-
ation model to it to disentangle the contributions of relatively more and less
intentional processes. As another example, Oberauer, Weidenfeld, and
H€ornig (2006) developed an MPT to reveal the contributions of multiple
processes to working memory capacity. This paucity of MPT research in
the domain of executive function may in part reflect cognitive psychologists’
focus on response latency to the relative exclusion of response accuracy. The
validity of latency versus accuracy is debatable; both aspects of responses
likely provide insight intomental contents (Klauer & Voss, 2008). However,
latency-based scoring methods typically depend on assumptions of process
purity—the limitations of which are well known. In contrast, analyzing
response accuracy in an MPT framework would require no modification
to existing executive function experimental paradigms, and could easily
be done in parallel with latency-based scoring methods. The low cost and
high potential benefit of applying MPTs to the study of executive function
suggest that this could be a worthwhile direction for future research.
In addition to the examples described above, it is easy to conceptualize
other contexts and conditions in which MPTs can fruitfully disentangle the
contributions of multiple processes to responses on measures of executive
functions. One possible candidate is the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen,
1974), which requires participants to respond to a target character (e.g., H)
that is presented either surrounded by response-compatible characters
(e.g., HHHHH) or by response-incompatible characters (e.g., KKHKK).
The difference in how quickly or accurately participants can respond to
response-compatible versus -incompatible trials is generally interpreted as
an index of inhibition. Unfortunately, the flanker task often demonstrates
poor retest reliability (W€ostmann et al., 2013). One possible explanation
for the low reliability of the flanker task is that the cognitive ability of inhi-
bition is highly variable (e.g., because of depletion, circadian rhythms, etc.).
However, tasks that measure inhibiting necessarily require the inhibition
of something (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Thus, another possible explana-
tion for the low reliability of the flanker task is that inhibition is relatively
stable but the impulses activated by flanker stimuli are highly variable
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(e.g., because of individual differences, saliency of information, etc.). MPTs
are well-suited to test competing hypotheses such as these in the context of
the flanker task and others.
In contrast to the extensive use of MPTs by cognitive psychologists ded-
icated primarily to studymemory, social psychologists have appliedMPTs to
a relatively wider variety of topics. Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation pro-
cedure, in particular, has arguably had an outsized influence among MPTs
on the field of social psychology. Since Payne (2001) adapted Jacoby’s mem-
ory model to investigate implicit stereotyping, social cognitive researchers
have applied MPTs to such diverse topics as prejudice (Conrey et al.,
2005), moral reasoning (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), processing fluency
(Fazio et al., 2015) and judgment and decision making (Damian &
Sherman, 2013). Because MPTs map easily onto the dual-process frame-
work of automaticity and control, they are readily applied to the many topics
in social psychology that are rooted in this dual-process framework. That
said, there are many more dual-process theories within social psychology
that have not yet been formalized as MPTs, spanning a wide variety of
domains, including persuasion (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo,
1986), attitude–behavior relations (e.g., Fazio, 1990), and impression for-
mation (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske &Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert, 1991; Trope,
1986), among others. These and other dual-process theories are fertile
ground for future researchers to formalize the contributions of multiple
processes quantitatively rather than verbally. In doing so, MPTs are poised
to advance social psychological theory. For example, MPTs can be espe-
cially useful in selecting the best among competing theories. In contrast
to traditional theory-selection approaches, which often involves an esca-
lating war of experiments between research camps purported to provide
the “critical test” of one theory over another (e.g., the long-running
battle between dissonance and self-perception theories: Fazio, Zanna, &
Cooper, 1977), competing theories instantiated as MPTs can be applied to
the same data and the victor determined quantitatively through model-
selection indices such as Akaike or Bayesian Information Criterion (AIC,
BIC, respectively).
3.4 Operating principles versus conditions
MPTs already have helped to advance theory in several important ways. For
example, many models were initially inspired by and based on dual-process
frameworks of automaticity and control (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2001).
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This distinction was based on the assumption that automatic processes are
initiated unintentionally, operate efficiently, cannot be terminated once
started, and operate outside of conscious awareness, whereas controlled pro-
cesses are initiated intentionally, depend on cognitive resources, can be
stopped voluntarily, and operate within conscious awareness (e.g., Bargh,
1999). Based on this distinction, the term “automatic” has largely become
a synonym for associative processes, and the term “control” a synonym for
executive function-type processes. However, a large body of research using
MPTs has made it clear that mapping processes onto the framework of auto-
maticity and control confounds the critical distinction between operating
principles and operating conditions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2009;
Sherman, 2006), particularly when separate tasks are used to measure auto-
matic versus control processes (e.g., free recall versus stem-completion
memory tasks; implicit versus explicit measures). Operating principles refer
to the qualitative nature of the cognitive processes that translate inputs into
outputs. That is, operating principles describe what the process does (e.g.,
inhibition). In contrast, operating conditions refer to the conditions under
which a given process operates (e.g., whenmotivation and processing capac-
ity are high; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). The overcoming bias parameter
of the Quad model (Conrey et al., 2005) provides an illustrative example of
the importance of separately considering operating principles and operating
conditions. The primary operating principle of overcoming bias is that it
inhibits the influence of mental associations on behavioral responses. One
operating condition of overcoming bias is that it influences responses within
relatively short response latencies (reflecting the task demands of the IAT), so
it may be categorized as relatively efficient. Consequently, from the perspec-
tive of the traditional framework of automaticity and control, overcoming
bias would be classified as a controlled process based on its operating prin-
ciples (i.e., it inhibits associations) but would be classified as an automatic
process based on its operating conditions (i.e., it is efficient; Rivers,
Calanchini, & Sherman, 2016). Such findings call into question the utility
of making categorical distinctions between automatic and controlled pro-
cesses and, as such, emphasize instead the qualitative, or algorithmic, nature
of cognitive processes (Sherman, Krieglmeyer, & Calanchini, 2014).
3.5 Choosing a model
Given the variety of MPTs in use across cognitive and social psychology,
researchers may wonder: Which one is best? The answer to this question
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is, in part, theoretical and, in part, analytical. For example, researchers inter-
ested in the influence of inhibitory processes will find an MPT that includes
inhibition (e.g., Conrey et al., 2005; Jacoby et al., 2005) to be more useful
than one that does not. That said, MPTs can be compared quantitatively to
evaluate which provides best fit to a given data set. For example, Bishara and
Payne (2009) applied five different MPTs to data from a weapons identifi-
cation task and calculated AIC and BIC as model-selection indices to deter-
mine which MPT best describes data from this task. In this way, MPTs can
help to advance both theory (i.e., validating or falsifying the assumptions
articulated by the model) and methodology (i.e., which model provides best
fit to data from a given task) by providing rigorous quantitative standards for
both model fit and selection.
3.6 Limitations of multinomial processing trees
Despite the many benefits of MPTs we have extolled in this chapter, they
are by nomeans a panacea. One limitation ofMPTs is that they are based on
categorical response data and often analyzed as a function of accuracy (e.g.,
Conrey et al., 2005). However, when mental resources are unconstrained
by procedural demands, such as time pressure or cognitive load, people
generally make relatively few mistakes on response conflict tasks. As such,
models based on individual-level data are necessarily limited in terms of
reliability and statistical power. These problems can be overcome in a num-
ber of ways. Implementing a response deadline can increase the relative
proportion of errors, and increasing the number of trials can increase the
absolute number of errors (seeMeissner &Rothermund, 2013 for an imple-
mentation of both of these strategies). However, such solutions come with
costs: Shorter response deadlines minimize the influence of some processes
and perhaps differentially constrain the influence of some forms of control
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; Nadarevic & Erdfelder,
2011). Similarly, increased trials may lead to depletion (Govorun &
Payne, 2006), which in turn may differentially impact resource-dependent
cognitive processes relative to more efficient cognitive processes. Thus,
though both of these solutions can increase the statistical reliability of
MPT estimates, they can also contaminate estimates of the processes that
are involved under different operating conditions and, therefore, may not
be ideal for all research applications. Alternately, data from multiple indi-
viduals can be aggregated to increase reliability, but this strategy is only
useful for group-level or between-groups analyses. Another solution is
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to embed the model within a hierarchical framework, which retains the reli-
ability benefits of group-level analyses while accommodating individual-level
heterogeneity (Klauer, 2006, 2010; also see Burke, 2015).
A more philosophical limitation of models based on accuracy data is that,
due to the relative infrequency of errors on most response-conflict tasks,
errors may arguably provide less insight into psychological processes than
do other aspects of responses (e.g., latencies). This point is debatable, of
course. However, whether or not they provide less insight, error data likely
provide insight into different psychological processes than do latency data.
For example, for research questions related to judgment errors (e.g., police
officers’ decisions to shoot or not shoot suspects), response accuracy likely
provides relevant information. In contrast, for research questions related
to judgment speed (e.g., how quickly officers can discern whether the object
a suspect is holding is a weapon), response latency may be more relevant.
Thus, both accuracy and latency reflect important psychological processes
(e.g., Pleskac, Cesario, & Johnson, 2018).
Very recently, Klauer and Kellen (2018) and Heck and Erdfelder (2016)
introduced methods to incorporate response latencies into MPTs. Such
RT-MPTs resolve the need to choose between response accuracy and
latency.Moreover, as an added bonus, RT-MPTs by definition rely onmore
data than do traditional MPTs, so they tend to generate more precise param-
eter estimates. Thus, RT-MPTs are very well positioned to make important
contributions to both the cognitive and social psychological literatures.
3.7 Alternatives to multinomial processing trees
In this chapter we have focused on MPTs as they apply to response conflict
tasks in cognitive and social psychology. However, MPTs are not the only
analytic option available to researchers interested in formally quantifying the
contributions of multiple cognitive processes. In addition to MPTs, several
other classes of formal models have been profitably applied to response con-
flict tasks within cognitive and social psychology, including signal detection
(e.g., Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Nosek & Banaji, 2001;
Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King, 1996), diffusion models
(e.g., Klauer, Voss, Schmitz, & Teige-Mocigemba, 2007; Ratcliff, Thapar,
Gomez, &McKoon, 2004; Ulrich, Schr€oter, Leuthold, & Birngruber, 2015;
White, Ratcliff, & Starns, 2011), and computational models (e.g., Cohen,
Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Gilbert & Shallice, 2002; Logan &
Cowan, 1984).
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3.8 Recommended readings
The purpose of this chapter is to review the origins and applications ofMPTs
to response conflict tasks by cognitive and social psychologists, and highlight
their utility for cross-disciplinary theoretical and methodological advance-
ment. However, due to constraints of space and scope, this chapter is not
meant to offer an exhaustive discussion of all relevant models. Interested
readers should seek out the primary research articles cited here for more
details. In addition to the original articles that have been cited throughout
this chapter, a number of thorough reviews exist. Riefer and Batchelder
(1988) is the seminal paper on MPTs in psychology. Batchelder and
Riefer (1999) and Erdfelder et al. (2009) both provide excellent reviews
of multinomial model theory and their applications within cognitive psy-
chology. Payne and Bishara (2009), Sherman, Klauer, and Allen (2010),
Klauer, Stahl, and Voss (2012), and H€utter and Klauer (2016) provide a vari-
ety of perspectives on process dissociation and multinomial models in social
psychology. For researchers interested in applying MPTs to their own data,
Stahl and Klauer (2007) and Moshagen (2010) offer stand-alone software
packages, and Singmann and Kellen (2013) and Heck, Arnold, and
Arnold (2018) offer R packages for this purpose.
Acknowledgments
Preparation of this manuscript was partially supported by a University of California, Davis
Dissertation-Year Fellowship and a postdoctoral research fellowship from the Alexander
von Humboldt Fellowship to J.C., and by an Anneliese Maier Research Award from the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to J.W.S. The funders had no role in the
preparation of the manuscript.
References
Amodio, D. M., Devine, P. G., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2008). Individual differences in the
regulation of intergroup bias: The role of conflict monitoring and neural signals for con-
trol. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 60–74.
Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E., Devine, P. G., Curtin, J. J., Hartley, S. L., &
Covert, A. E. (2004). Neural signals for the detection of unintentional race bias. Psycho-
logical Science, 15, 88–93.
Bar-Anan, Y., & Nosek, B. A. (2014). A comparative investigation of seven indirect attitude
measures. Behavior Research Methods, 46(3), 668–688.
Bargh, J. A. (1999). The cognitive monster: The case against the controllability of automatic
stereotype effects. In S. Chaiken &Y. Trope (Eds.),Dual-process theories in social psychology
(pp. 361–382). New York: Guilford Press.
Batchelder, W. H., & Riefer, D. M. (1990). Multinomial processing models of source mon-
itoring. Psychological Review, 97, 548–564.
Batchelder,W. H., &Riefer, D.M. (1999). Theoretical and empirical review of multinomial
process tree modeling. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(1), 57–86.
59Multinomial processing trees
Batchelder, W. H., Riefer, D. M., & Hu, X. (1994). Measuring memory factors in source
monitoring. Psychological Review, 101, 172–176.
Bayen, U. J., Murnane, K., & Erdfelder, E. (1996). Source discrimination, item detection,
and multinomial models of source monitoring. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learn-
ing, Memory, and Cognition, 22, 197–215.
Beer, J. S., Stallen, M., Lombardo, M. V., Gonsalkorale, K., Cunningham, W. A., &
Sherman, J. W. (2008). The quadruple process model approach to examining the neural
underpinnings of prejudice. NeuroImage, 43(4), 775–783.
Begg, I. M., Anas, A., & Farinacci, S. (1992). Dissociation of processes in belief: Source rec-
ollection, statement familiarity, and the illusion of truth. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: General, 121(4), 446–458.
Bishara, A. J., & Payne, B. K. (2009). Multinomial process tree models of control and auto-
maticity in weapon misidentification. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(3),
524–534.
Bluemke, M., Crombach, A., Hecker, T., Schalinski, I., Elbert, T., & Weierstall, R. (2017).
Is the implicit association test for aggressive attitudes a measure for attraction to violence
or traumatization? Zeitschrift f€ur Psychologie, 225(1), 54–63.
Bosson, J. K., Swann,W. B., Jr., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2000). Stalking the perfect measure of
implicit self-esteem: The blind men and the elephant revisited? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 79(4), 631.
Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull &
R. S. Wyer (Eds.),Advances in social cognition: Vol. 1 (pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Buchner, A., Erdfelder, E., Steffens, M. C., & Martensen, H. (1997). The nature of memory
processes underlying recognition judgments in the process dissociation procedure.Mem-
ory & Cognition, 25, 508–517.
Buchner, A., Erdfelder, E., & Vaterrodt-Plunnecke, B. (1995). Toward unbiased measure-
ment of conscious and unconscious memory processes within the process dissociation
framework. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124, 137–160.
Buchner, A., &Wippich,W. (1996). Unconscious gender bias in fame judgments?Conscious-
ness and Cognition, 5(1–2), 197–220.
Burke, C. T. (2015). Process dissociation models in racial bias research: Updating the analytic
method and integrating with signal detection approaches. Group Processes & Intergroup
Relations, 18(3), 402–434.
Chaiken, S. (1987). The heuristic model of persuasion. In M. P. Zanna, J. M. Olson, &
C. P. Herman (Eds.), Social influence: The Ontario symposium: Vol. 5 (pp. 3–39).
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cohen, J. D., Dunbar, K., &McClelland, J. L. (1990). On the control of automatic processes:
A parallel distributed processing account of the Stroop effect. Psychological Review, 97(3),
332–361.
Conrey, F. R., Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Hugenberg, K., & Groom, C. J. (2005). Sep-
arating multiple processes in implicit social cognition: The quad model of implicit task
performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(4), 469–487.
Conway, P., & Gawronski, B. (2013). Deontological and utilitarian inclinations in moral
decision making: A process dissociation approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 104(2), 216.
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officer’s dilemma:
Using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1314–1329.
Cunningham, W. A., Preacher, K. J., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). Implicit attitude measures:
Consistency, stability, and convergent validity. Psychological Science, 12(2), 163–170.
Damian, R. I., & Sherman, J.W. (2013). A process-dissociation examination of the cognitive
processes underlying unconscious thought. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49,
228–237.
60 Jimmy Calanchini et al.
Donders, F. C. (1969). On the speed of mental processes. Acta Psychologica, 30, 412–431.
Erdfelder, E., Auer, T. S., Hilbig, B. E., Assfalg, A., Moshagen, M., & Nadarevic, L. (2009).
Multinomial processing tree models. A review of the literature. Journal of Psychology, 217,
108–124.
Erdfelder, E., & Buchner, A. (1998). Decomposing the hindsight bias: A multinomial
processing tree model for separating recollection and reconstruction in hindsight. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 24(2), 387–414.
Eriksen, B. A., & Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon the identification of a
target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception & Psychophysics, 16(1), 143–149.
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behavior: The MODE
model as an integrative framework. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23,
75–109.
Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., & Marsh, E. J. (2015). Knowledge does not
protect against illusory truth. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144(5),
993–1002.
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., &Williams, C. J. (1995). Variability in automatic
activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 69(6), 1013–1027.
Fazio, R. H., Sanbonmatsu, D.M., Powell, M. C., & Kardes, F. R. (1986). On the automatic
activation of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(2), 229–238.
Fazio, R. H., Zanna, M. P., & Cooper, J. (1977). Dissonance and self-perception: An inte-
grative view of each theory’s proper domain of application. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 13(5), 464–479.
Ferreira, M. B., Garcia-Marques, L., Sherman, S. J., & Sherman, J.W. (2006). Automatic and
controlled components of judgment and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 91(5), 797–813.
Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category-
based to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention
and interpretation. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 1–74.
Friedman, N. P., &Miyake, A. (2004). The relations among inhibition and interference con-
trol functions: A latent-variable analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
133(1), 101–135.
Gawronski, B., Armstrong, J., Conway, P., Friesdorf, R., & H€utter, M. (2017). Conse-
quences, norms, and generalized inaction in moral dilemmas: The CNI model of moral
decision-making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113(3), 343–376.
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2009). Operating principles versus operating condi-
tions in the distinction between associative and propositional processes. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 32(2), 207–208.
Gawronski, B., Morrison, M., Phills, C. E., & Galdi, S. (2017). Temporal stability of implicit
and explicit measures: A longitudinal analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
43(3), 300–312.
Gilbert, D. T. (1991). How mental systems believe. American Psychologist, 46, 107–119.
Gilbert, S. J., & Shallice, T. (2002). Task switching: A PDP model. Cognitive Psychology,
44(3), 297–337.
Gonsalkorale, K., Sherman, J. W., & Klauer, K. C. (2009). Aging and prejudice: Diminished
regulation of automatic race bias among older adults. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, 45(2), 410–414.
Gonsalkorale, K., Sherman, J. W., & Klauer, K. C. (2014). Measures of implicit attitudes may
conceal differences in implicit associations: The case of antiaging bias. Social Psychological
and Personality Science, 5(3), 271–278.
Gonsalkorale, K., von Hippel, W., Sherman, J. W., & Klauer, K. C. (2009). Bias and reg-
ulation of bias in intergroup interactions: Implicit attitudes toward Muslims and interac-
tion quality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(1), 161–166.
61Multinomial processing trees
Govorun, O., & Payne, B. K. (2006). Ego-depletion and prejudice: Separating automatic and
controlled components. Social Cognition, 24(2), 111–136.
Greenwald, A. G. (2012). There is nothing so theoretical as a good method. Perspectives on
Psychological Science, 7(2), 99–108.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem,
and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102(1), 4–27.
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. (1998). Measuring individual differ-
ences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 74(6), 1464–1480.
Hallett, P. (1978). Primary and secondary saccades to goals defined by instructions. Vision
Research, 18, 1279–1296.
Heck, D. W., Arnold, N. R., & Arnold, D. (2018). TreeBUGS: An R package for hierar-
chical multinomial-processing-tree modeling. Behavior Research Methods, (1), 1–21.
Heck, D.W., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Extending multinomial processing tree models to mea-
sure the relative speed of cognitive processes. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(5),
1440–1465.
H€utter, M., & Klauer, K. C. (2016). Applying processing trees in social psychology. European
Review of Social Psychology, 27(1), 116–159.
H€utter, M., & Sweldens, S. (2013). Implicit misattribution of evaluative responses:
Contingency-unaware evaluative conditioning requires simultaneous stimulus presenta-
tions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(3), 638.
H€utter, M., Sweldens, S., Stahl, C., Unkelbach, C., & Klauer, K. C. (2012). Dissociating
contingency awareness and conditioned attitudes: Evidence of contingency-unaware
evaluative conditioning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141(3), 539.
Jacoby, L. L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from inten-
tional uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513–541.
Jacoby, L. L. (1998). Invariance in automatic influences of memory: Toward a user’s guide for
the process-dissociation procedure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory,
and Cognition, 24(1), 3.
Jacoby, L. L., Bishara, A. J., Hessels, S., & Toth, J. P. (2005). Aging, subjective experience,
and cognitive control: Dramatic false remembering by older adults. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 134(2), 131–148.
Klauer, K. C. (2006). Hierarchical multinomial processing tree models: A latent-class
approach. Psychometrika, 71(1), 7–31.
Klauer, K. C. (2010). Hierarchical multinomial processing tree models: A latent-trait
approach. Psychometrika, 75(1), 70–98.
Klauer, K. C., Dittrich, K., Scholtes, C., & Voss, A. (2015). The invariance assumption in
process-dissociation models: An evaluation across three domains. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 144(1), 198–221.
Klauer, K. C., & Ehrenberg, K. (2005). Social categorization and fit detection under cogni-
tive load: Efficient or effortful? European Journal of Social Psychology, 35(4), 493–516.
Klauer, K. C., & Kellen, D. (2018). RT-MPTs: Process models for response-time distribu-
tions based on multinomial processing trees with applications to recognition memory.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 82, 111–130.
Klauer, K. C., & Meiser, T. (2000). A source-monitoring analysis of illusory correlations.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(9), 1074–1093.
Klauer, K. C., & Oberauer, K. (1995). Testing the mental model theory of propositional rea-
soning. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 48(3), 671–687.
Klauer, K. C., Stahl, C., & Voss, A. (2012). Multinomial models and diffusion models.
In K. C. Klauer, A. Voss, & C. Stahl (Eds.), Cognitive methods in social psychology
(pp. 331–354). New York: Guilford Press.
62 Jimmy Calanchini et al.
Klauer, K. C., & Voss, A. (2008). Effects of race on responses and response latencies in the
weapon identification task: A test of six models. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
34(8), 1124–1140.
Klauer, K. C., Voss, A., Schmitz, F., & Teige-Mocigemba, S. (2007). Process components of
the implicit association test: A diffusion-model analysis. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 93(3), 353–368.
Klauer, K. C., & Wegener, I. (1998). Unraveling social categorization in the “who said
what?” paradigm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(5), 1155–1178.
Krieglmeyer, R., & Sherman, J. W. (2012). Disentangling stereotype activation and stereo-
type application in the stereotype misperception task. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 103(2), 205–224.
Lindsay, D. S., & Jacoby, L. L. (1994). Stroop process dissociation: The relationship between
facilitation and interference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Per-
formance, 20(2), 219–234.
Logan, G. D., & Cowan,W. B. (1984). On the ability to inhibit thought and action: A theory
of an act of control. Psychological Review, 91(3), 295–327.
Meiser, T., &Hewstone,M. (2004). Cognitive processes in stereotype formation: The role of
correct contingency learning for biased group judgments. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 87(5), 599–614.
Meissner, F., & Rothermund, K. (2013). Estimating the contributions of associations and
recoding in the implicit association test: The ReAL model for the IAT. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 104(1), 45–69.
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., &Wager, T. D.
(2000). The unity and disunity of executive functions and their contributions to complex
“frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49–100.
Moors, A., & De Houwer, J. (2006). Automaticity: A theoretical and conceptual analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 132(2), 297–326.
Moshagen, M. (2010). multiTree: A computer program for the analysis of multinomial
processing tree models. Behavior Research Methods, 42(1), 42–54.
Nadarevic, L., & Erdfelder, E. (2011). Cognitive processes in implicit attitude tasks: An
experimental validation of the TRIP model. European Journal of Social Psychology,
41(2), 254–268.
Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2001). The go/no-go association task. Social Cognition, 19(6),
625–664.
Oberauer, K. (2006). Reasoning with conditionals: A test of formal models of four theories.
Cognitive Psychology, 53(3), 238–283.
Oberauer, K., Weidenfeld, A., & H€ornig, R. (2006). Working memory capacity and the
construction of spatial mental models in comprehension and deductive reasoning. Quar-
terly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 59(2), 426–447.
Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and perception: The role of automatic and controlled pro-
cesses in misperceiving a weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(2),
181–192.
Payne, B. K. (2005). Conceptualizing control in social cognition: How executive function-
ing modulates the expression of automatic stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 89(4), 488–503.
Payne, B. K., & Bishara, A. (2009). An integrative review of process dissociation models in
social cognition. European Review of Social Psychology, 20, 272–314.
Payne, B. K., Burkley, M., & Stokes, M. B. (2008).Why do implicit and explicit attitude tests
diverge? The role of structural fit. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 16–31.
Payne, B. K., Hall, D. L., Cameron, C. D., & Bishara, A. J. (2010). A process model of affect
misattribution. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 1397–1408.
63Multinomial processing trees
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion.
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 19, 123–205.
Plant, E. A., & Peruche, B. M. (2005). The consequences of race for police officers’ responses
to criminal suspects. Psychological Science, 16(3), 180–183.
Pleskac, T. J., Cesario, J., & Johnson, D. J. (2018). How race affects evidence accumulation
during the decision to shoot. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(4), 1301–1330.
Ramos, M. R., Baretto, M., Ellemers, N., Moya, M., Ferreira, L., & Calanchini, J. (2015).
Exposure to sexism can decrease implicit gender stereotype bias. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 46(4), 455–466.
Ratcliff, R., Thapar, A., Gomez, P., &McKoon, G. (2004). A diffusion model analysis of the
effects of aging in the lexical-decision task. Psychology and Aging, 19(2), 278–289.
Riefer, D. M., & Batchelder, W. H. (1988). Multinomial modeling and the measurement of
cognitive processes. Psychological Review, 95, 318–339.
Rivers, A. M., Calanchini, J., & Sherman, J. W. (2016). The self-regulation of implicit social
cognition. In K. D. Vohs & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), Handbook of self-regulation: Research,
theory and applications (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford Press.
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information
processing: I. Detection, search, and attention. Psychological Review, 84(1), 1–66.
Sherman, J. W. (2006). On building a better process model: It’s not only how many but
which ones and by which means? Psychological Inquiry, 17(3), 173–184.
Sherman, J. W., Gawronski, B., Gonsalkorale, K., Hugenberg, K., Allen, T. J., &
Groom, C. J. (2008). The self-regulation of automatic associations and behavioral
impulses. Psychological Review, 115(2), 314–335.
Sherman, J. W., Groom, C. J., Ehrenberg, K., & Klauer, K. C. (2003). Bearing false witness
under pressure: Implicit and explicit components of stereotype-driven memory distor-
tions. Social Cognition, 21(3), 213–246.
Sherman, J. W., Klauer, K. C., & Allen, T. (2010). Mathematical modeling in social cogni-
tion: The machine in the ghost. In B. Gawronski & B. K. Payne (Eds.), Handbook of
implicit social cognition: Measurement, theory, and applications (pp. 156–175). New York:
Guilford Press.
Sherman, J. W., Krieglmeyer, R., & Calanchini, J. (2014). Process models require process
measures. In J. W. Sherman, B. Gawronski, & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-process theories of
the social mind (pp. 121–138). New York: Guilford Press.
Singmann, H., & Kellen, D. (2013). MPTinR: Analysis of multinomial processing tree
models in R. Behavior Research Methods, 45(2), 560–575.
Snyder, H. R., Miyake, A., & Hankin, B. L. (2015). Advancing understanding of executive
function impairments and psychopathology: Gridging the gap between clinical and cog-
nitive approaches. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 1–24.
Stahl, C., & Degner, J. (2007). Assessing automatic activation of valence: A multinomial
model of EAST performance. Experimental Psychology, 54(2), 99–112.
Stahl, C., & Klauer, K. C. (2007). HMMTree: A computer program for latent-class hierar-
chical multinomial processing tree models. Behavior Research Methods, 39(2), 267–273.
Stroop, J. R. (1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental
Psychology, 18, 643–662.
Trope, Y. (1986). Identification and inferential processes in dispositional attribution. Psycho-
logical Review, 93, 239–257.
Ulrich, R., Schr€oter, H., Leuthold, H., & Birngruber, T. (2015). Automatic and controlled
stimulus processing in conflict tasks: Superimposed diffusion processes and delta func-
tions. Cognitive Psychology, 78, 148–174.
Unkelbach, C., & Stahl, C. (2009). A multinomial modeling approach to dissociate different
components of the truth effect. Consciousness and Cognition, 18(1), 22–38.
64 Jimmy Calanchini et al.
White, C.N., Ratcliff, R., & Starns, J. J. (2011). Diffusionmodels of the flanker task: Discrete
versus gradual attentional selection. Cognitive Psychology, 63(4), 210–238.
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model of dual attitudes. Psychological
Review, 107(1), 101–126.
W€ostmann, N.M., Aichert, D. S., Costa, A., Rubia, K., M€oller, H. J., & Ettinger, U. (2013).
Reliability and plasticity of response inhibition and interference control. Brain and Cog-
nition, 81(1), 82–94.
Yonelinas, A. P., Dobbins, I., Szymanski, M. D., Dhaliwal, H. S., & King, L. (1996). Signal-
detection, threshold, and dual-process models of recognition memory: ROCs and con-
scious recollection. Consciousness and Cognition, 5(4), 418–441.
65Multinomial processing trees
